
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**TISS New Faces I9 (2018)**

**Dissertation Abstracts**

**Molly Berkemeier**

***Trust in International Politics: The Role of Leaders in Nuclear Politics, Alliances, and Conflict.***

In my dissertation, I focus on how leader relationships influence cooperation on nuclear issues, alliances, and conflict resolution, asking whether shared social identities between leaders make cooperation more likely. I address this question using a combination of historical cases and quantitative empirical analysis, finding that leaders with more shared social identities are better able to cooperate in international politics, even while accounting for strategic factors known to effect cooperation. Shared social identities between leaders contribute to an increased likelihood of cooperation because shared identity makes it easier to understand and trust another. My work makes the novel move of going beyond the analysis of individual leader backgrounds to think about the role and importance of relationships *between* leaders in international politics. Further, understanding the conditions under which cooperation is more likely, and the intersection of strategic factors alongside psychological and behavioral motivations, contributes to our understanding of international political dynamics.

 In my chapter, ``Trust in International Politics: Identity, Interpersonal Relationships, and Nuclear Cooperation,'' I consider how interpersonal relationships between world leaders influence cooperation on nuclear issues. I argue that leaders who share more similar social identities are more likely to trust each other, allowing for increased cooperation. Using data on nuclear cooperation agreements and leaders' identities, including early and adult life identities, socio-economic status, and ideology, I find that leaders who share more social identities are more likely to engage in nuclear cooperation, even while controlling for strategic factors known to influence cooperation. I illustrate these empirical findings with a discussion of Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement on nuclear issues. This research provides evidence that interpersonal relationships among leaders shape international relations in one important context, thereby contributing to our understanding of how leaders matter in world politics, and the conditions under which states can cooperate

**Mariya Grinberg**

***Planning for the Short Haul: Trade Among Belligerents in War.***

In times of war, why do belligerents continue to trade with each other? In my dissertation, I develop a theory to explain the variation in state’s wartime commercial policies. I show that states set product level commercial policies to balance two potentially conflicting goals – maximizing state revenue from continued trade during the war and minimizing the ability of the opponent to benefit from security externalities of the trade. States are more likely to trade with the enemy in (1) products that their opponents take a long time to convert into military capability and (2) products that are essential to the domestic economy. The amount of time it takes the opponent to convert gains from trade into military capabilities determines which products are too dangerous to be traded during a war. The mitigating factor is the amount of revenue the state can extract from trade and from the circulation of the product in the domestic economy. The more essential the product is to the domestic economy, the less a state can afford to lose trade in it. Furthermore, I argue that changes to a state’s commercial policy during the war depend on the military progress of the war. As the expectation of the length of war increases, the number of prohibited products will increase since the opponent will have more time to benefit military from the gains of trade. Similarly, a state’s willingness to bear the cost of losing trade increases with the scale of war. The closer the war gets to being existential, the more wartime trade with the enemy the state will give up. The dissertation tests this theory using the comparative case study method, looking at four case studies – Crimean War (1854-6), World War I, World War II, India-Pakistan relationship from 1945 to 2000.

**Ira Hubert**

***Clinging to the Anti-Imperial Mantle: The Republic of China’s Encounter with the Decolonizing World, 1942-1971.***

My dissertation project, *Clinging to the Anti-Imperial Mantle: The Republic of China’s Encounter with the Decolonizing World, 1942-71,* is a critical reinterpretation of Chinese statecraft. It aims at the restoration of the Republic of China (ROC) to its rightful historical place as an important Cold War actor. The recovery of the entanglements between anti-communist Chinese diplomats working for the government of Chiang Kai-shek and Third World nationalists provides us with a better appreciation of how the borders that emerged during the Cold War have created problems to the present day. The dissertation explores how Chinese Nationalists, after their evacuation from the mainland to the small island of Taiwan in 1949-50, tried to locate their non-western diplomacy in between contests of postcolonial sovereignty in distant parts of the world and those at the periphery of China itself. It shows how Republican China’s condition as a divided nation-state—proclaimed to the world as only temporary—shaped its diplomats’ approaches to building inter-national alliances. The chapters explore: the ROC’s elevation as a great power during World War II; self-defining maneuvers by ‘Free China’ at the United Nations in the years before the Beijing People’s Republic joined the U.N. organization; the ideology of Pan-Asianist regionalism during the Cold War; ROC connections with Catholic allies across continents; and ROC military cooperation with like-minded anti-communist governments in the 1960s and 1970s. All in all, my work challenges simplistic accounts that trace the consolidation of ‘One China’ norms to the Sino-American rapprochement of 1971-79 under the Nixon and Carter Administrations. Chiang’s diplomats represented one of two Chinese regimes that paraded the world stage, each as ‘an international fact,’ for over two decades. The legacy of their activities casts long shadows on the Cross-Straits dilemma and at the U.N. Security Council to this day.

**Thomas Jamison**

***The New Navy's Pacific Wars: Peripheral Conflict and the Making of the Modern U.S. Navy, 1861-1898.***

Using a transnational methodology and sources in three languages on four continents, my research follows the entangled histories of naval development in the Confederate States of America (CSA), Peru, Chile, Japan and China as well as the reciprocal effects of those states on the formation of the “New Navy”: the first major peacetime U.S. military expansion, c. 1882-1898. Specifically it explores: the CSA during the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865); Peru and Chile during the War Against Spain (1864-1866), the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) and Chilean Civil War (1891); and finally the self-strengthening movements of Qing China and Japan, including the Sino-French War (1884-1885) and the First Sino-Japanese War

(1894-1895).

My historiographical aim in exploring these military developments is three-fold. First, in an effort to “provincialize Europe,” I plot out the South-South connections between the navies of the CSA, Chile, Peru, China and Japan. Second, shifting perspective to the semi-periphery makes clear how “Hot Wars” in the Americas and the Pacific not only created demand for experimental naval designs, but also offered an operational laboratory for the evaluation of first generation weapons. As such, “modern naval warfare” became “modern” not solely or even primarily in the staff colleges and laboratories of the North Atlantic core, but through syncretic exchange with the semi-periphery during the late 19 the century. Finally, for U.S. politicians and strategists, the success of semi-peripheral navies with novel technologies represented at once a challenge to the United States’ “new empire” as well as two crucial opportunities: in the absence of great power war, violence around the semi-periphery provided both an enemy against which to posture and hard data about the efficacy of developmental weapon systems.

**Reid Pauly**

***Stop or I'll Shoot, Comply and I Won't: The Dilemma of Coercive Assurance.***

There is a dilemma at the heart of coercion. Successful coercion requires not only that I credibly threaten you until you comply, but also that I credibly assure you that I will *not* punish you after you comply. In this dissertation, I develop and test Coercive Assurance Theory to show that coercion succeeds when credible threats are paired with credible assurance. I then test competing theories of the causes of coercive assurance credibility. Existing literature on commitment-making in international politics implies an inverse linear relationship—a tradeoff—between threat and assurance credibility. Instead, I propose that the credibility of threats and assurances may vary independently. In particular, I argue that states can generate credible assurances through two strategies: Coercive Control and Reducing Visibility. Asserting coercive control reduces target fears of capricious punishment. Visibility reduction mitigates target fears of acquiring a reputation for concessions. To investigate these competing theories, I turn to the universe of cases of coercive bargaining between non-allies over nuclear weapons programs. I code each case of “redline-making” over nuclear programs, revealing cross-national variation in coercion success. From this universe I select the cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iran for process tracing and comparative analysis. My research uses archival documents and interviews. The dissertation concludes with policy implications and a “shadow case” on North Korea. The ingredients of credible threats are distinct from the ingredients of credible assurance. Understanding coercion success and failure demands that we treat these concepts distinctly.

**Mary Elizabeth Walters**

***Unexpected Humanitarians: Albania, the U.S. Military, and Aid Organizations during the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Crisis.***

Using archives and oral history, this dissertation examines three forms of humanitarianism during the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Crisis: local Albanians, the U.S. military, and international aid organizations. It explores how these groups developed ethical and moral frameworks to justify humanitarianism, how this humanitarianism shaped assistance, and how they interacted with each other, as well as with ethnic Albanian Kosovar refugees, especially since these three groups differed greatly in capacity and culture. It finds that the success of refugee assistance depended not only on the capacity (financial, logistical, and material), but also on the cultures of these groups. First, Albanians developed a grassroots humanitarianism premised on the key cultural and moral concept of *mikpritja*, hospitality, as well as shared ethnicity. Doing so reframed refugees as guests, an underlying principle in traditional Albanian ethical and legal codes. Second, the U.S. military had an abundance of capacity, but was slow to develop a rationale for refugee assistance. Gradually from the bottom-up, soldiers reimagined their military humanitarianism as an extension of American military culture’s emphasis on protecting American civilians. Third, numerous aid organizations practiced traditional Western humanitarianism, emphasizing nonviolence and impartiality. These values fit poorly with both Albanian and U.S. military cultures and practices. This combined with aid organizations’ general lack of capacity contributed to their marginalization throughout the crisis. Regardless of the fact that these three strands of humanitarianism remained largely disconnected, their interactions still proved mutually reinforcing and successfully provided shelter, food, and assistance to over 450,000 Kosovar refugees in Albania. The dynamic between these three groups and their differing ethical understandings of humanitarianism help to illuminate a common dynamic in refugee crises, namely the need for militaries, local communities, and international aid organizations to learn and relearn how to find common ground and work together to provide humanitarian assistance.